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Abstract—A significant limitation of current cyber security
research and techniques is its reactive and applied nature.
This leads to a continuous ‘cyber cycle’ of attackers scanning
networks, developing exploits and attacking systems, with defend-
ers detecting attacks, analyzing exploits and patching systems.
This reactive nature leaves sensitive systems highly vulnerable
to attack due to un-patched systems and undetected exploits.
Some current research attempts to address this major limitation
by introducing systems that implement moving target defense.
However, these ideas are typically based on the intuition that a
moving target defense will make it much harder for attackers
to find and scan vulnerable systems, and not on theoretical
mathematical foundations. The continuing lack of fundamental
science and principles for developing more secure systems has
drawn increased interest into establishing a ‘science of cyber
security’. This paper introduces the concept of using cybernetics,
an interdisciplinary approach of control theory, systems theory,
information theory and game theory applied to regulatory sys-
tems, as a foundational approach for developing cyber security
principles. It explores potential applications of cybernetics to
cyber security from a defensive perspective, while suggesting the
potential use for offensive applications. Additionally, this paper
introduces the fundamental principles for building non-stationary
systems, which is a more general solution than moving target
defenses. Lastly, the paper discusses related works concerning
the limitations of moving target defense and one implementation
based on non-stationary principles.
Keywords—Cybernetics, Control Theory, Feedback, Information
Theory, Computer Networks, Computer Security
I. INTRODUCTION
With computer networks now providing the backbone for
critical systems in financial centers, heath care, governments,
militaries, public infrastructures and other industries world-
wide, cyber security has emerged as a significant research
area for academia, industry and government. Developing more
secure systems is paramount as computers are further inte-
grated into everyday life and store increasing amounts of
sensitive data. However, a significant limitation of current
security research is that the many solutions, both past and
present, are a purely reactive response to known vulnerabilities
∗ “The information in this paper consists of general capabilities data
from public sources and is not subject to any International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR) or Export Administration Regulations (EAR) controls.”
and attacks. This leads to implementations that mitigate these
vulnerabilities, using techniques such as patching, encryption
and firewalls, but still leave sensitive systems exposed to
undiscovered attacks. In addition, innovative solutions used
to solve past security issues can quickly become obsolete as
technology improves and matures.
Relying on a reactive methodology for improving cyber
security has resulted in what some have coined as an ‘arms
race’ [1], [2], [3], [4] or also a ‘cyber cycle’ as shown in
Figure 1. Essentially, the current state of cyber security can
be viewed as a continuous game between network attackers
and defenders. On one side, a defender designs and deploys a
system on its network to provide a service to its users. Concur-
rently, the attackers are scanning that network, analyzing any
available systems in order to determine their properties and
any other types of communication channels or vulnerabilities
that might exist. Once the attacker has discovered a vulnerable
target (typically a result of poor security design or coding
flaw), their next step is to obtain malware that exploits those
vulnerabilities. At this point, the defender is monitoring the
network (using tools such as intrusion detection and firewall
systems) attempting to detect any successful attacks on the
network. If the attacker is successful in exploiting discovered
vulnerabilities, they can use the unauthorized access to their
benefit, which may include data exfiltration, denial of service
for other users, performance degradation, system destruction,
etc. If and when the defender detects the attack on the system,
they must first recover the system to a stable state and then
analyze the affected systems and malware to determine what
vulnerabilities were exploited. After this, they must design
a new patch or security strategy to protect the system from
further exploit, which results in the cycle repeating with
attackers rescanning and reanalyzing the systems, searching
for new vulnerabilities [2], [4].
Responding to attacks in this manner is not sufficient;
security research must have a fundamental change in its focus
to a balance of theoretical and applied research designed
to disrupt the “cyber cycle” [2]. Past approaches tended
to focus on application and protocol-specific vulnerabilities
and were typically applied solutions that did not consider
fundamental issues. Good examples of such solutions are
HTTPS, DNSSEC, and two-factor authentication, which solve
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Fig. 1. Cyber Cycle
simple problems such as authentication integrity and insecure
communication, but do not solve major fundamental problems
like insecure web servers, DNS cache poisoning, and breakable
passwords [5]. In each case, the solution provided greater
security for a specific vulnerability, but the main protocols
were essentially unchanged and did not change the fact the
systems remain highly vulnerable. Applied solutions alone
cannot solve the larger fundamental issues in cyber security,
and new research must be built on fundamental mathematical
principles.
Some engineers and scientists in the areas of network and
computer security have recognized the need for a change in
security research. However, there is still a division between
applied and fundamental research that needs to be addressed.
For example, one popular approach with many researchers,
further discussed in section V, is the principle of moving
targets applied to network addressing, configuration, and web-
server security and reliability [6], [7]. But, these projects
still lack fundamental principles needed to create more secure
systems. Moving target defense research is mostly based on the
correct intuition that moving targets are more difficult to hit.
On the other hand, there have been several groups within the
government, including the Departments of Defense, Energy,
and Homeland Security, that have recognized the need for
a more fundamental scientific approach. In 2005, the Presi-
dent’s Information Technology Advisory Committee (PITAC)
released their report [8], which recognized that add-on security
and continuous software patches are inadequate to protect
the significant network infrastructure in the government and
acknowledged the need for longer-term fundamental research
that would provide a basis for future security research. The
2010 report [2] from the JASON group in MITRE stated the
need for a combination of applied and theoretical research
and also discussed how applications from other sciences could
help build up a ‘science of cyber-security’. A chapter written
by Dr. Alexander Kott in the Springer series Advances in
Information Security [9], went as far as developing semi-
formal equations and definitions with the understanding that
malware is a significant problem of cyber-security. Similar
papers have developed fundamental definitions and equations
for describing the attack surfaces of a system [10], [11].
This type of research work has identified that deficiencies
exist, but has been unable to demonstrate the mathematical
foundation required to quantitatively measure the effectiveness
of a cyber security solution. The application of cybernetics and
control theory will attempt to fill this void and provide a new
framework established from proven mathematical constructs
that will serve as the basis to develop a new class of cyber
security solutions.
The purpose of this paper is to introduce the science
of cybernetics as a fundamental base for security research.
Even though cybernetics covers multiple disciplines including
control theory, systems theory, information theory and game
theory, this paper will specifically focus on the control theory
aspects of cybernetics. Using the concepts of feedback and
system control, better theoretical approaches and mathemat-
ical principles can be developed and deployed to improve
applied security solutions. As mentioned in the JASON report,
security research should be a combination of both applied
and theoretical approaches. Using cybernetics as a starting
point for security research develops fundamental models that
can be quickly applied to current security solutions. In some
cases, those models can be used to validate and improve
moving target systems currently being developed. In other
cases, using a cybernetic-based approach provides researchers
with a different perspective from which to analyze security
issues and develop models and solutions that help break the
continuous cyber cycle.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II quickly introduces the motivation for applying cybernetic
principles to cyber-security. Section III provides a basic intro-
duction of several cybernetic concepts which are applied to a
cybernetic model of the cybercycle in Section IV. In addition,
this section further explores cybernetic applications to cyber-
security and provides several insights into developing a science
of cyber-security. Finally, Section V discusses some existing
implementions
II. WHY CYBERNETICS?
Claude Shannon, the recognized father of information
theory, is quoted as having said in the 1940s to Norbert Wiener,
the father of cybernetics, “Use the word ‘cybernetics’ Norbert,
because nobody knows what it means. This will always put you
at an advantage in arguments [12].
Indeed, as we researched our ideas to discover whether
there were others that had written on the connection between
cybernetics and cyber security, we discovered no academic
literature specifically applying cybernetic concepts to cyber
security. Because of this perceived lack of domain knowledge
and the fact that the pioneers of the subject themselves admit
it is a somewhat obscure topic, we will first attempt to explain
a few tenets of the subject as an introduction to our thesis. In
doing so, however, we will ignore more recent developments
in cybernetics such as second and third-order cybernetics and
concentrate more on the root of the cybernetic development
tree reaching back to the 1940s and 1950s. In doing so, we
recognize we may be ignoring areas directly applicable to
our thesis. It is our hope, however, to spawn creativity in
individuals with advanced expertise in cybernetics to contribute
further to our efforts in establishing cybernetics as a foundation
for the ‘science of cyber security’.
So, what is cybernetics? Cybernetics is the regulation of
systems [13]. It was born in the pre-digital computer era when
a handful of people saw the need for the science of regulating
systems. This is not unlike our need to develop a science of
cyber security today. As they began developing the principles
and tenets of the discipline, they discovered that these logical
and mathematical principles, not being tied to any specific
physical embodiment, applied equally well from the molecule
to the galaxy. The term cybernetics, derived from the Greek
word ‘κυβνητης’ meaning ‘steersman, governor, pilot, or
rudder,’ was used by Norbert Wiener for his 1948 introductory
text on the subject [14]. In 1957, subsequent to Wiener’s work,
William Ashby added to the domain by publishing his often-
cited book, “An Introduction to Cybernetics [15].” We will
refer a great deal in section III of this paper to this well-
written text. Therefore, to the interested reader of our thesis,
we recommend the time investment of reading it from cover to
cover. For we can in no way cover in a few paragraphs what
Ashby took 295 pages to cover, and we will simply refer to
many of the assertions from his text.
Cybernetics utilizes elementary mathematical ideas to de-
velop a basic framework for discussing feedback, stabil-
ity, equilibrium, disturbance, regulation, information, entropy,
noise, transmission (communication), constraints, and amplifi-
cation to name a few. All these abstract tenets, when put in the
context of the desired physical embodiment, can be applied
to virtually any discipline of science, physics, engineering,
biology, physiology, neurology, psychology, etc. In fact, the
more complex the system, the more the derived tenets of
cybernetics such as “the Law of Requisite Variety”, help reduce
the complexity of the ‘variety in disturbances’ to a level that
the system can be regulated even in the face of fixed regulation
capacity [15, pp. 246-247]. Hence, with our assertions yet to
come in section IV, these principles apply to cyber security.
To close this section it seems important to lean toward
how these abstract cybernetic tenets will be applied to the
specific subject of cyber security. We believe that control
theory, game theory, system theory, and information theory,
when viewed through the lens of cybernetics, provide the tools
to focus on breaking the cyber cycle. The next section will
develop, as far as can be allowed in this forum, the basics of
how these disciplines apply. Suffice it to say there are many
corollary developments, which derive from this thesis, but can
be published and discussed only in approved forums.
III. CYBERNETICS OVERVIEW
A. Open Loop
Control theory is a branch of applied mathematics that
focuses on dynamic systems. Systems have time-varying inputs
X(t) and outputs Y (t), where the relationship between input
X(t) and output Y (t) is governed by a transfer function of
integral-differential equations G(t) as seen in Figure 2. To
simplify the math from solving calculus equations to solving
algebraic equations, we generally evaluate these systems in the
complex frequency domain, also known as the Laplace domain.
Thus, the system becomes Y (s) = X(s)G(s), where G(s)
represents the same transfer function. Such systems are defined
as “open loop” systems because they do not use feedback to
determine if the output has achieved a desired value. There
are three cyber security related points to be made here about
open-loop systems. First, in making the transformation to the
Laplace domain, time has been removed from the analysis –
thus making the system stationary. Second, open-loop systems
Fig. 2. Open-loop System
Fig. 3. Cybernetic View of an Open-loop System
are highly sensitive to changes in the system’s open loop
transfer function G(s) + ∆G(s), as can be seen by the
sensitivity equation in Figure 2 and in texts on control theory
[16], [17], [18]. Third, it is easy to show that if the input is
composed of an input signal and a disturbance or error signal:
X(s) = I(s) + D(S) then, Y (s) = I(s)G(s) + D(s)G(s).
Therefore, the transfer function has the same effect on the
disturbance signal as the input signal.
Cybernetics, however, provides an alternative view of the
open-loop system via a “diagram of immediate effects” [15,
pp. 57] The system and its susceptibility to parameter change
and disturbance signals are shown in Figure 3. In this figure,
there is a machine X that provides an input to a “transducer”
T [15, pp. 46], which provides an output to a machine Y .
Any parameter changes to the transducer are modeled as
disturbance inputs and are lumped in with the other input
disturbances, which were modeled as D(S) above [15, pp.
216-217].
Despite the fact these two figures have some apparent
diagrammatic similarities, they really do not convey the same
meaning. The control theory viewpoint represents the trans-
formation from one set of physical parameters to another as
input to output (i.e., pressure to voltage, voltage to speed,
speed to fluid density, voltage to temperature, etc.). The
cybernetic viewpoint, however, is that information in the form
of probability weighted “Variety” [15, pp. 140][15, pp. 174]
– (also known as “Entropy”) is being produced in machine
X . This information is then combined with information from
disturbance sources D [15, pp. 198] and then transformed
from one representative form of information to another in the
transducer T [15, pp. 140]. Finally, the information ends up as
input at machine Y . The arrows of this diagram of immediate
effects represent channels of communication that must exist
for this system to operate [15, pp. 210]. However, cybernetics
fully expects these channels of communication are not always
physical connections. Sometimes these connections are based
on behavioral relations between endpoints [15, pp. 180].
Weiner defined [14] “the amount of information” or the
entropy measured in bits as:
H =
∑
i
pi log2(pi) (1)
Where pi is the probability of an event and,∑
i
pi = 1 (2)
This is similar to work that Shannon did for information
theory [19] except for an insignificant minus sign that cancels
out when calculating information gain. For an excellent ex-
planation of why this minus sign is insignificant see [15, pp.
177]. The importance of the idea of entropy here is that many
of the properties of information theory apply to cybernetics.
These will be leveraged further later.
B. Closed Loop
As every undergraduate control theory student remembers,
open-loop systems are quickly passed over for the more ca-
pable closed-loop or ‘error-controlled system’, which is based
on negative feedback. These systems look similar to those in
Figure 4, along with their stability equations. Some examples
are the thermostat-controlled water bath, the air conditioning
system, the cruise control, etc.
Given that cybernetics is the regulation of systems, one
would expect Ashby’s cybernetics text to offer an immediate
discussion of closed-loop feedback systems. Surprisingly, how-
ever, this is not the case until near the end of his text. Instead,
he focuses on something that is unrealizable and what he
calls the perfect regulator, which he derives based on a game
theory and system theory approach. This perfect regulator is
unrealizable because it has the ability to counter the effects of
the disturbance input in real-time as it is occurring. It is shown
in the diagram of immediate effects in Figure 5. The D and
the T in this figure again represent disturbance sources and
the transducer respectively as in Figure 3. The outcome Y has
been changed to E to map more closely with Ashby’s text and
his examples, but no change in its meaning is intended. The
R represents this “perfect regulator” to which we have been
referring. At first glance, it may not seem like an unrealizable
system until one recognizes that in the case of the thermostat-
controlled water bath, the regulator would have to react as
Fig. 4. Closed-loop System
Fig. 5. Cybernetic View of a Perfect Regulator
described by Ashby as, “I see someone coming with a cold
flask that is to be immersed in me – I must act now [15, pp.
222].”
So if the system is unrealizable, why does Ashby spend
time discussing it at all? The answer is analogous to why
our physics professors discussed the “friction-less surface”,
the “mass-less spring”, or any of a host of other unrealistic
scenarios; because so much can be learned from these simpli-
fied environments while still being applicable in more specific
cases.
Some additional cybernetics definitions and concepts we
will use later are:
1) Variety is based on the permutations and/or combina-
tions inherent in a set of distinguishable elements or
inputs and can be measure in bits [15, pp. 125-126].
2) Variety – (and thus information) is not altered or
lost by coding of a one-to-one transformation within
transducers [15, pp. 142] [15, pp. 185-186].
3) Information can be uniquely restorable to its original
form after passing through several codes in succes-
sion provided that the variety in the set is preserved
at every stage [15, pp. 142].
4) If a transform U has an inverse U−1, then both U and
U−1 have one-to-one transformations where U−1’s
coding will restore the original message that was
coded with U ’s encoding [15, pp. 142].
5) The regulator R – (whether perfect or not) blocks and
controls the flow of variety to perform its function
[15, pp. 199-201].
6) Output variety in control cannot be less than distur-
bance variety divided by regulation variety [15, pp.
205].
7) #6 above said another way based on Logarithmic
measure is V0 ≥ VD − VR, where V0 is the variety
of the outcome, VD is the variety of the disturbances
and VR is the variety of the regulator. (This equation
is known as the “Law of Requisite Variety [15, pp.
206-207].”)
8) A corollary to #6 and #7 above is that only variety
in R can force down the variety due to D; in other
words, variety can destroy variety [15, pp. 206-207].
9) Constraints – (a condition that occurs when the
variety that exists under one condition is less than the
variety that exists under another) are the mechanisms
used by regulators to reduce variety [15, pp. 127] [15,
pp. 130].
10) Every law of nature is a constraint [15, pp. 130].
11) R’s capacity as a regulator cannot exceed R’s capac-
ity as a channel of communication [15, pp. 211].
Given that some of these concepts about variety and
constraints will be leveraged for our thesis shortly, it seems
particularly important to give some illustrations to help bring
the details to life. To do this, we will illustrate using a few
examples from Ashby’s text (modified slightly to improve
clarity of context), which we will complete to help explain
their meaning:
C. Examples
Example of Variety versus Constrained Variety [15, pp.
133]
Given a vector has ten components, where each component
must be a member of the set {1, 2, 3, 4}, answer the following:
1) How much variety does each component have?
2) How much variety exists for the possible set of
vectors if the components vary independently?
3) How much variety exists if no two adjacent compo-
nents may differ in value by more than one unit?
Answers:
1) With the given set, each component can have 1 of 4
values so each has a variety of 4.
2) Our vector is of the form < P0, P1, ..., P9 >, where
Pi are the members of the set {1, 2, 3, 4}. Since order
does matter, the variety of the set of possible vectors
is equal to the permutation 410 = 1048576. This can
also be written in bit notation: Variety = log2 4
10 =
20.0 bits.
3) 21892 or log2 21892 = 14.4 bits.
Proof:
For easier notation, take the equivalent problem of sequences
of the letters {a, b, c, d} subject to:
xi = a→ xi+1 = a or b
xi = b→ xi+1 = a or b or c
xi = c→ xi+1 = b or c or d
xi = d→ xi+1 = c or d
Let Ai be the number of such sequences of length I
that start with the letter a
Let Bi be the number of such sequences of length I
that start with the letter b
Let Ci be the number of such sequences of length I
that start with the letter c
Let Di be the number of such sequences of length I
that start with the letter d
By the constraints, conclude that:
Ai+1 = Ai +Bi
Bi+1 = Ai +Bi + Ci
Ci+1 = Bi + Ci +Di
Di+1 = Ci +Di
With the base case of A1 = 1, B1 = 1, C1 = 1, D1 = 1:
By induction, will show:
Bi = Ci = F2i → Fibonacci of 2i
Ai = Di = F2i−1 → Fibonacci of 2i− 1
This proves that the number of such sequences (total) is:
Ai +Bi + Ci +Di = 2(F2i + F2i−1)
= 2F2i+1
Base case i = 1 is true because F1 and F2 are 1, which is the
same as A1, B1, C1, D1.
Inductive case for A:
Ai+1 = Ai +Bi = F2i−1 + F2i
= F2i+1 = F2(i+1)−1
Inductive case for B:
Bi+1 = Ai +Bi + Ci = F2i−1 + F2i + F2i
= F2i+1 + F2i = F2i+2 = F2(i+1)
Inductive case for C:
Ci+1 = Bi + Ci +Di = F2i + F2i + F2i−1
= F2i + F2i+1 = F2i+2 = F2(i+1)
Inductive case for D:
Di+1 = Ci +Di = F2i + F2i−1
= F2i+1 = F2(i+1)−1
Q.E.D
Example #1 of Regulator’s Channel Capacity [15, pp. 211]
A ship’s telegraph from bridge to engineroom can deter-
mine one of nine speeds not more often than one signal in
five seconds, and the wheel can determine one of fifty rudder
positions in each second. Since experience has shown that this
means of control is normally sufficient for full regulation,
estimate a normal upper limit for the disturbances (gusts,
traffic, shoals, etc.) that threaten the ship’s safety.
Bridge to engine room control variety:
VR(Engine Room) =
log2 (9 speeds)
5 secs
= 0.63 bits/sec
Rudder regulation variety:
VR(Rudder Control) =
log2 (50 positions)
1 sec
= 5.64bits/sec
Now from the Law of Requisite Variety (V0 ≥ VD − VR) and
assuming the ship is in control:
0 ≥
∑
VD −
∑
VR∑
VD ≤ 6.3 bits/sec
Example #2 of Regulator’s Channel Capacity [15, pp. 211]
A general is opposed by an army of 10 divisions, each of
which may maneuver with a variety of 106 bits in each day.
His intelligence comes through 10 signalers, each of whom
can transmit 60 letters per minute for 8 hours in each day, in a
code that transmits 2 bits per letter. Is his intelligence channel
sufficient for him to be able to achieve complete regulation?
Individual division variety:
VD(Division) = 106 bits/day
∴ VD(Army) = 10 ∗ 106 = 107 bits/day
General’s intelligence regulation channel:
VR(Channel) = 10 signalers ∗ 60 letters/min ∗
60 min/hour ∗ 8 hours/day ∗
2 bits/letter
= 576000 bits/day
The Law of Requisite Variety tells us that in order for the
general’s intelligence channel to be in control, 0 ≥ VD − VR.
Because in this case VD  VR , we know (to use Ashby’s
words) the General’s intelligence channel “is grossly insuffi-
cient.”
As we can see from the first example, the amount of
variety was reduced by 5.6 bits by simply constraining the
environmental conditions. The next two examples of regulation
showed systems where control was desired. The Law of
Requisite Variety was used to show a bound for control in the
former case based on the disturbance channel not exceeding
6.3 bits/second. In the later case, the Law of Requisite Variety
predicts the demise of the General’s army because his channel
for regulation is undersized by 17.36 times. These examples,
though simple in concept (and based on variety rather than
entropy because of their equally probable inputs), lead exactly
to the point of the cyber security problem, as we will discuss
next.
IV. CYBERNETIC APPLICATIONS TO CYBERSECURITY
Now that we have laid an introductory foundation for
cybernetics, we can focus on addressing the cyber cycle by
using cybernetics for a new approach.
A. Cyber Cycle
As previously mentioned, new cyber security research must
have a significant focus on breaking the continuous cyber cycle
described earlier in Figure 1. However, before we delve too
deeply into this discussion, we first need to consider how the
cyber cycle appears from a cybernetic perspective. A major
difference is the attacker and defender’s systems (GA(S) and
GD(S) respectively) are closed-loop feedback systems with
output that feeds into the input of the corresponding system
as seen in Figure 6. Notice, that we are not specifically
defining what the system looks like from a theoretic systems
standpoint; however, some examples could be a sensitive com-
puter network, an embedded controller in a SCADA system
or someone’s personal electronics (laptop, smart phone and
tablet). Also, the feedback loops and other communication
channels within the systems may use behavioral relations
rather than physical connectivity. Using this perspective, the
main concept is that actions taken by either the attacker or
defender (through each systems regulator and transducer) will
affect the input into the rival system. Examples of this include
an attacker probing a system or a defender encrypting outgoing
network traffic.
This cybernetic and control theory view of the cycle pro-
vides an excellent method to understand the cycle’s continuous
propagation. Initially, an attacker uses the defender’s output
to modify their output to negatively affect the defender. This
could be any type of attack including Denial-of-Service or
intrusion. Either way, it would cause some type of disturbance
input to the defender’s system, which would negatively affect
that system and its output. Hopefully, the defender would
detect the disturbances and attempt to mitigate those inputs
through methods such as resetting their systems, adding net-
work access control (firewalls) or developing patches. At this
point, the system would return to its balanced state and the
attacker would attempt to re-modify their system to create a
new input disturbance. As long as the defender only responds
to known and/or detected input disturbances, this cycle will
continue indefinitely.
B. Stability
Again, since cybernetics was initially developed as a sci-
ence of regulated systems, one of its primary concentrations
Fig. 6. Cybernetic View
is system stability. By viewing the attacker and defender
through the lens of cybernetics, it would appear that one of
the defender’s primary goals would be to regulate an attacker’s
input to stabilize their defensive system’s output. To better
analyze this, consider a simplistic example of a public kiosk
at a retail store used for online shopping. From a cybernetic
standpoint, the system itself is a transducer that converts
customer input to the final order. Examples of malicious or
disturbance inputs could be an attacker modifying the system
to steal customer information or making malicious orders from
random accounts. Simplifying this, the system can have two
states, clean or infected (variety of two), which would require
a regulator capable of rebooting the system to a clean state
whenever malicious activity is detected. The defender’s goal
would be to reset the system as soon as possible once malicious
activity was detected to keep the system stable.
However, this simplistic example (while possible to im-
plement) is far from an optimal real-world solution for a
couple of reasons. First, the basic characterization of the
kiosk’s possible states is not sufficient to use as a model for
current systems. For example, given enough time, a determined
hacker could successfully compromise the system (even with
locked-down permissions and read-only drives) and install
malware that persists through reboots. At this point, the reboot
process (regulator) becomes useless because the system will
still be infected. From the cybernetic viewpoint, this would
be characterized as variety the regulator could not account for
because the system is too complex when taking into account
behavioral channels. As systems become more complex and
have more variety, the Law of Requisite Variety requires the
corresponding regulator to have equal or greater variety in
order to stabilize the system. In a calculus sense, this becomes
an unbounded equation where: (x refers to system complexity
and the function refers to regulator complexity).
lim
x→∞F (x) =∞ (3)
Continuing this example, the defender must be able to build
a regulator that is capable of mitigating any attacks. From a
real-world perspective, it is well known that as computers,
networks, and software become increasingly complex, it is
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to know every exploit,
behavioral channel (social engineering) or attack vector that
might exist. In reality, there is always some unknown vulner-
ability or new social engineering exploit that can introduce
unknown variety into the system, meaning any regulator is
deficient.
Secondly, the simplistic example assumes every attack can
be detected (similar to above) and that it can be detected in
enough time to reset the system without affecting legitimate
users. As we just mentioned, some unknown exploit will
always exist as systems become more complex, meaning any
detector will be just as deficient as the regulator. Even if the
system could detect the attack, to ensure stability it must be
able to respond quickly enough to avoid affecting its users.
In the case of the kiosk, a simple reboot may be sufficient
on today’s hardware, but most real-world systems require
additional patching and other mitigation techniques. A good
example is the recent hack and downtime of all of Apple’s
developer centers [20], which took three days to detect and
over a week to mitigate.
Overall, this example is excellent proof of why current
security techniques are ultimately lacking. From a cybernetic
standpoint, defensive systems relying on a ‘detect then miti-
gate’ strategy to build secure systems are inherently unstable.
There will always be an attack that either remains undetected
or causes significant downtime to patch, leading to instability.
This example also demonstrates that, while it is a beneficial
design model (further discussed in section V, a stability
approach alone is not a feasible method to break the cyber
cycle. Using stability, the cycle could be broken if a system
was designed, such that it was capable of detecting any and
all disturbance inputs (from an attacker) and counteracting
them in real time. In cybernetics, this would be considered
a perfect regulator and as Ashby alluded to in his work, this
is unrealizable. This is consistent with the real-world fact that
it is impossible to know every attack vector.
C. Constrained Variety
Even though stable, secure systems are difficult to build
from a cybernetic viewpoint, one way to improve them and
reduce their complexity is to use the concept of constrained
variety. Essentially, the goal is to reduce the amount of
disturbance variety (attacks) coming into the system. Based
on the law of requisite variety, reducing disturbance inputs
reduces the amount of control needed in order to regulate the
system, which makes controlling the system more likely. In
other words, the goal is to block attackers from exploiting the
network and prevent users from accessing malicious content
(even behaviorally). This role is currently fulfilled by systems
such as firewalls, access control, VPNs and content filters.
However, this constrained variety approach (again while
beneficial) is still vulnerable to the same unknown exploits and
behavioral attacks as the stability approach. Reducing input
disturbances could reduce the probability that a known attack
or a probing type attack would be initially successful, but it
does not eliminate it. The ultimate example of a system with
constrained variety would be a sensitive computer network not
physically connected to the Internet and only accessible by
authorized personnel. However, as recent history has shown
with Stuxnet [21] and Wiki-leaks [22], such systems are
still vulnerable to behavioral channel exploits. In both cases,
constraining the input variety to the system by isolating it from
physical networks did not eliminate some behavioral channels
and left the system vulnerable to eventual attack.
D. Instability and Non-stationarity
As we have seen, focusing strictly on constraining dis-
turbance input and stabilizing the defender’s system presents
a very difficult security problem. However, if we expand
our focus and take into account the actual communication
channels between the attacker and defender (both inputs and
outputs from the defender’s perspective), we can see a different
approach to breaking the cyber cycle. Previously, attempts
to break the cycle focused on stabilizing the system and its
outputs no matter what an attacker inputs. Defenders do not
usually take into consideration the attacker’s communication
channel. However, if a system were to be designed, such that
it and its communication channels (input and/or output as seen
from the attacker’s perspective) appear unstable, non-stationary
or pseudo random, the attackers would face increasing diffi-
culty trying to compromise the system. This type of system
disrupts the cyber cycle by constantly adapting, thus making
it difficult for attackers to even analyze, let alone communicate
with the system.
If a defender’s system G(S) is encoded, then cybernetic
theory predicts that this can be accomplished so that an
inverse also exists. Using such an encoding for the system’s
input constrains the input variety in the cybernetic sense. This
means that defenders can create specific channels that regulate
or control the amount of variety allowed into the system.
Additionally, if this is done in such a way that it is non-
stationary, or pseudo chaotic, then G(S) becomes G(S, t).
Thus, the system could be viewed as being encoded with a
transform U which eliminates malicious disturbance inputs
because attackers lack the U−1 secret decoder ring.
Many time-dependent attacks can be mitigated by encoding
a system in a non-stationary way. For example, if a defender
assumed that an attacker would eventually be able to find a
behavioral channel of communication, such as insider threats,
then they should also assume that an attacker could analyze
their system or vulnerabilities at time t < n. Also, the
defenders should be able to quantify a bound on the amount
of entropy in their system by predicting probabilities of distur-
bance variety, based on historical incidents correlated with user
access to the U−1 transform. Using the predicted entropy and
the Law of Requisite Variety, the defenders can modify their
system so that once the attackers attempt to install malware,
∆G(s, t < n), the system will have moved to G(S, t ≥ n).
Provided that the non-stationary change to G(S, t ≥ n) is
sufficient to prevent installation and/or exploitation of the
previously scanned vulnerabilities, the attackers will not be
successful.
In addition, a non-stationary approach can be applied to
both the input and output of the defender’s system. Both
approaches increase the complexity needed for an attacker’s
successful compromise of the defender’s system. If we con-
sider non-stationary output, such as rotating encryption keys,
the attacker must be able to determine what keys are used
and when they change. If their only option were to brute force
attack each key and those keys are cycled before they can crack
a single one, they would have a difficult time eavesdropping
on communication. Another example of non-stationary input
to a system would be a rotating authentication scheme similar
to two-factor authentication. By constantly changing how a
legitimate user finds and/or logs into the system, the attackers
would have increasing difficulty even trying to discover or
brute force attack the authentication system.
Cybernetics show that by increasing the possible variety in
the defender’s system and/or constraining input variety, the at-
tackers must also increase the amount of variety in their system
in order to regulate a communication channel between the two
systems. For a constrained system, the attacker must increase
his variety, either hoping to determine the inverse of encoding
to access the system or to generate a new communication
channel that bypasses those constraints. This is one reason
phishing attacks are used so often; attackers are attempting
to simply bypass the security without spending significant
time analyzing the system. Using a non-stationary system,
the defender forces attackers to handle extra variety (possible
configurations) and disturbance inputs (parameter changes)
while attempting to stabilize the system. However, today many
systems are completely stationary, making an attacker’s task far
less complicated. The notion of stationary system development,
though trivial to visualize in the complex frequency domain,
is still easy to understand in the time domain. In essence, once
built, the system components and/or parameters do not change.
Once an attacker scans the system, they can develop malware
and attack it (which can take considerable time depending on
the system), confident the system has not been changed since
the initial scan. Designed and implemented correctly, non-
stationary systems eliminate this assumption for the attackers.
E. Breaking the Cyber Cycle
As we shift focus back to the goal of breaking the cyber
cycle, it becomes apparent that many of todays security solu-
tions, even those with some amount of outer layers of non-
stationarity, are simply stationary open-loop systems at their
core. Many systems do not take into account the redeeming
features of closed-loop systems and as a result are highly
susceptible to disturbance inputs. For example, how often is
a computer network topology designed as a feedback loop or
how many CPUs use feedback to ensure memory interactions
work as expected? In order to break the cyber cycle, security
research needs to make a fundamental shift toward using
cybernetic principles and the concepts of non-stationarity,
stability and constrained-variety as the building blocks for
secure systems.
In general, a cybernetic-influenced solution should incor-
porate all of these solutions, however non-stationarity will
probably attract the most attention. The main purpose for
building non-stationary systems is to dramatically increase the
complexity for any attackers. This means that a system should
Fig. 7. Relations of Stochastic Processes: Non-stationary, Poly-
cyclostationary, Cyclostationary, and Stationary
be designed so that every component is non-stationary and
constantly adapting to complicate tasks for the attacker. As
more components of the system become non-stationary, the
overall complexity increases according to the Law of Requisite
Variety. The example of variety versus constrained variety in
section III is another way to consider this. Here, a single
component of the vector has a variety of four. However, as
components are combined to produce a large unique vector,
the variety of the system grows exponentially. Our goal would
be to design systems that follow the same principle; as more
components are combined to uniquely define the system,
the complexity grows exponentially [23]. However, since the
system must be usable, some components may be required
to remain stationary, which is understandable. An excellent
example would be a publically available webserver; without
some stationary component, legitimate users would not be able
to access it. Still, the goal for researchers is to implement
non-stationary systems that are constantly behaving in an
unpredictable manner to the attackers, but a predictable one
to the users.
In some cases, it could be difficult to generate a completely
non-stationary process for a system. However, just as adding
multiple layers increases complexity, interleaving multiple
stationary processes together can result in the appearance of a
non-stationary system. This is also known as a cyclo-stationary
process, which is often used in communications. As a whole
process appears non-stationary, it can easily be isolated into
each subcomponent with a simple understanding of the cyclic
nature of the interleaving. Figure 7 is a Venn diagram showing
how a non-stationary signal (NS) can be contained within it:
[24]
• A stochastic process (S) where FX(t)(x) is indepen-
dent of the time translation parameter t,
• A cyclostationary (CS) process with period T where
FX(t)(x) is periodic in t with period T ,
• A poly-cyclostationary (PCS) signal with period T =
T1, T2, T3, Where FX(t)(x) is poly-periodic in t
with period T .
At this point, there will be those who recognize that there
exist many solutions in academia and industry for creating
“moving target” and diversity defenses that are very similar
to our concept of non-stationary systems [10], [11]. In fact,
the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) and the
Network and Information Technology Research and Develop-
ment program (NITRD) have identified moving target defenses
as a major focus for developing game-changing cyber security
solutions [23], [25]. These solutions can include randomiza-
tion for memory addresses, instruction sets, encryption keys,
network configurations, virtual machines, operating systems,
etc. However, while many of these solutions employ some
of the properties discussed above, not all are sufficient to
break the cyber cycle and be classified as non-stationary.
In fact, when considering methods for breaking the cyber
cycle, moving target solutions should be considered as a tool
for implementing non-stationary systems rather than being a
solution on their own. The following paragraphs help provide
clarity why:
1) Most moving target defense research is focused on
building a specific technology or implementation
rather than considering an entire system. Narrowing
the focus too much to specific technology ignores
the fact that behavioral channels or other attack
vectors can completely bypass the defense, rendering
it useless (further discussed in section V) [10].
2) Many systems have not deployed non-stationary so-
lutions throughout, but instead it is argued that im-
plementing moving targets outside of a system, as a
hardened shell, is a sufficient solution. Simply adding
a moving target to the outside of a stationary system
does not ensure the system is secure. In addition,
single layer moving target defenses do not provide
adequate protection. For example, in 2011, a well-
known and respected randomization token provider
for two-factor authentication was hacked. This hack
cost the company millions to issue new tokens. It
was not the randomization token that was hacked, but
rather the stationary aspects of their internal solution.
In these cases, the system behind the moving target
defense was stationary leaving the system vulnerable
to behavioral channels.
The application of cybernetics to this problem sug-
gests that unless the entire solution is encoded to
constrain incoming communication channels (regu-
lated), then a disturbance variety source will find
a path that bypasses the shell completely. Once a
behavioral channel was exploited, the hackers were
able to compromise the system itself without regard
to penetrating the two-factor authentication. There-
fore, the moving target solution becomes irrelevant.
Therefore, given enough time such a path can be
exploited, even if it has an extremely low probability
of being found.
3) Most moving target solutions offer no mathemati-
cal foundation for predicting when a system should
change. Some use a set frequency (such as 24 hours);
while others simply state the system must move
twice the time it takes an attacker to compromise
a stationary system [26] based in some rudimentary
form on the Nyquist sampling theorem. These values
are completely subjective and depend on the type
of attack and the target. However, cybernetics and
Law of Requisite Variety [15] predict the theoretical
regulation requirement for preventing cyber intrusion
based on variety and/or entropy. This is analogous
to how entropy predicted Shannon’s channel capacity
and coding theory [15, pp. 183-186].
0 ≥
∑
HD −
∑
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Here, HD is the disturbance entropies (probabilistic
varieties) allowed to enter the system of interest, and
HR is the regulation system’s entropies employed to
constrain the initial disturbances. From this equation,
it is easy to see that systems fully exposed to high
bandwidth channels (i.e. the Internet) pose great
cyber security risk unless constrained. This is be-
cause the amount of disturbance variety has no upper
bound. Additionally, regulation entropies are often
fixed, especially with existing systems, since non-
stationary system development is not a widespread
trend today.
4) Some solutions, such as uniquely compiled applica-
tions and address-space layout randomization, do not
continuously adapt their configuration during runtime
[10], [27]. In the case of compiler-generated diversity,
the randomization occurs as a user downloads ap-
plications from a store; address randomization only
occurs during task creation, meaning long running
tasks are not constantly randomized. These type of
defenses are most effective in blocking wide spread
attacks against static addressing and binaries. How-
ever, over the long run, it still leaves individual
systems vulnerable to attack. Given enough time,
determined attackers can discover ways to exploit
vulnerabilities in these stationary systems despite
the trivially implemented layers of “moving target
defense”. In other words, a moving target system that
is implemented, but never changed, might as well be
a stationary system given enough time.
5) Though it is outside the scope of this paper, one
final reason is that moving target defense research
is specifically focused on defensive implementations.
On the other hand, non-stationary systems can involve
far more than just defensive applications.
While moving target defenses alone are not sufficient to
break the cyber cycle, when combined with the principles of
cybernetics, we can get a better picture on how cyber systems
should be designed. One of the major benefits that cybernetics
offers to the less-than-optimal solution of using layered moving
target defense is predicting an upper bound on the amount of
time needed before a change is recommended. This would be
based on the variety of all known interactions with the system
(both human and machine) plus a sufficient safety margin for
unknown channels.
F. Addressing Reliability and Usability
When considering how to build non-stationary systems that
break the cyber cycle, it is paramount to ensure the current
requirements of normal operations avoid negative impact. The
ability to maintain normal operations requires addressing the
system’s ability to provide a reliable and predictable system
with minimal impact to usability.
An entire architecture that is completely non-stationary
would likely require implementing Ashby’s perfect regulator.
Therefore, to provide enough predictability to allow normal
behavior, a hybrid approach is assumed to be necessary at some
level. That being said, however, enough layers of entropy must
be present and leveraged to diminish an attacker’s attempts.
Additionally, reducing stationarity at the system’s core will
cause more difficulty for the attackers and reduce the chances
a bypass behavioral channel will be successful. This is the
balance that follow-on applied research of these cybernetic
ideas must achieve. We recommend future research examine
areas such as:
1) The theoretical limits to which non-stationary func-
tions can be utilized in a system.
2) The time variance and entropy that can be introduced
by a non-stationary system in order to maintain
reliable communications.
3) Modeling and simulation of typical and common
systems to verify theoretical analysis.
4) The impacts of cybernetics on closed-loop systems
and closed-loop system properties such as: instability,
time delay, root locus, etc.
5) The impacts of cybernetics on advanced control the-
ory topics such as Kalman filters.
6) The creation of new forward and inverse non-
stationary transforms that provide stability for normal
operation.
V. RELATED APPLICATIONS
As discussed in the previous section, there are many
examples of ongoing applied research based on an intuitive
perspective of cybernetics. The purpose of this section is to
provide a limited set of specific examples of the broader
assertions made previously, and to show how cybernetics
predicts the limitations of these approaches. Additionally, we
will discuss one system whose technology development was
based in the ideas of non-stationarity. Therefore, it offers a
portion of the variety needed to create a highly non-stationary
network solution without making the claim that it is a complete
solution for breaking the cyber cycle.
A. Effectiveness of Moving Target Defenses
In the second chapter of “Moving Target Defense: Cre-
ating Asymmetric Uncertainty for Cyber Threats”, Evans et
al. address the effectiveness of common diversity defenses
against several types of attacks [10]. They specifically focus on
implementations of address space randomization, instruction
set randomization and data randomization. These defenses are
designed to complicate attacks by randomizing data locations
or program instructions. In addition, they develop a probability
model for successful attacks, which is similar to ours, based
on entropy in the defender’s system.
Using this model, they evaluate the effectiveness of each
defense against several attack types: circumvention attacks,
deputy attacks, brute force, entropy reduction, probing at-
tacks and incremental attacks. Based on their analysis, layout
randomization defenses have no advantage defending against
circumvention and deputy attacks, since these attacks are
specifically designed to bypass the randomization . In the case
of deputy attacks, the attacker uses other legitimate software
on the system to bypass the randomization. In the case of
entropy reduction, these defenses may at most double the
attack duration before it is successful. For the last two attacks,
probing and incremental, diversity defenses may provide a
distinct advantage if the randomization is rapid enough.
Based on their evaluations, a good observation to make is
that diversity defenses must continuously be randomized in or-
der to be effective against attacks. In the case of address space
layout randomization, many current implementations provide
limited randomization to the base address for the executable.
Also, this randomization usually only occurs during process
creation [27]. Because of this, an attacker can circumvent these
defenses for long running tasks since they do not change over
time.
B. Resilient Web Services
Another good moving target example to analyze is an
implementation for supporting web services [28], [6], [10].
Overall, the system was designed using a control theory
approach intended to keep a pool of virtual servers in their
stable state. The system used a closed-loop control circuit
between the pool of virtual servers, network sensors and a
controller for detecting attacks and resetting affected servers
to their initial state in order to wipe out any malicious activity
on the system. In addition, diversity is added to the system by
randomizing the configurations of installed software for each
virtual machine. A dispatcher takes requests from the public
Internet and routes it to a clean virtual machine to serve the
request.
This design presents a good example of stability from a
cybernetic perspective. Resetting affected servers to an initial
install state allows the system to be kept in a relatively stable
state to break up an attacker’s communication channels. How-
ever, even though this system is a moving target and does have
some non-stationary properties, it is not completely equivalent
to a non-stationary system. While it does employ a level
of diversity with the web-server software stack, the number
of possible configurations is relatively low. If an attacker
finds a specific configuration and develops an attack offline,
it would only be a matter of time before that configuration
serves a request (especially with a large botnet sending several
attacks). Once successful, the attacker does need to contend
with server resets. This does provide a level of non-stationarity
for the attacker (since it interrupts their control), but this is
more a stability aspect of the system. Given enough time, an
attacker could develop methods to attack any configuration
and attempt to compromise the underlying virtualization rather
than the servers themselves. In addition, the system is not
moving its address on the Internet, leaving it vulnerable to
Denial of Service attacks. A truly non-stationary system would
constantly be moving its logical location making it harder for
an attacker to find, much less attack.
C. Hypervisor for Web Browsing
Legacy systems connected to a network are considered
stationary and can be infected by a variety of viral software
constructs, generally referred to as malicious software or
malware. Without the knowledge of the user, malware can
be unintentionally downloaded to a computer allowing for the
installation of various types of subservient software. Many of
these system exploits are undetectable by commercial antivirus
solutions and will survive a system reboot, thus providing
an attacker with persistent control over the computer while
the system owner is completely oblivious to the compromised
system.
L-3 Communications National Security Solutions
(STRATIS) has developed a sophisticated, yet simplistic,
virtualized hardened solution to break the attack chain on
stationary systems. The solution creates a hardened virtual
barrier between individual, “guest” nodes accessing “at risk”
services such as the Internet and their host network. The
architecture has been developed to block the ability for a
hosted system on a trusted local area network (LAN) to
directly communicate to an untrusted environment (e.g.,
Internet). Access to untrusted environments is provided by
the virtual node, without the risk of compromise to the host
or corresponding trusted host network.
The virtual machine can access an external system but can-
not communicate directly to resources on the trusted network
(e.g., LAN/WAN). The solution provides a scalable system that
can be applied to a variety of system architectures or hardware
configurations, supporting traditional bare metal and virtual
desktop infrastructure systems.
The host computer operates a hypervisor logically sepa-
rating the virtual machine from the host computer’s operat-
ing system. The secure virtual abstraction layer operates a
modified application (e.g., Internet browser) that connects the
system through an encapsulated and restricted communication
path to the untrusted environment. The virtual guest operates
internally as a normal system, except that it relies on the host
connection as a transport. The guest appears as a single node
machine such as a public kiosk or home PC and contains no
intellectual property or data of value to an adversary.
From a cybernetic perspective, this solution provides both
non-stationarity and stability for the system. Stationarity is
interrupted and resiliency is increased by utilizing a security-
hardened, revertible system that provides enhanced anomaly
detection that takes action when dangerous data has been
encountered by the guest operating system. If compromised,
the guest environment is automatically restored from a known,
clean image, removing all infections and disrupting any remote
control and exfiltration channels that break any persistence by
the adversary. In addition, it provides stability for the user by
restoring the virtual system when anomalies are detected or
at the users’ time discretion. Overall, this results in a non-
stationary system with a feedback loop to the host system.
VI. CONCLUSION
The goal of cyber-security should be to develop multilay-
ered, non-stationary systems that meet certain criteria. From
the instability perspective, they should be unpredictable and
highly complex – forcing attackers to have complex systems.
They must be constantly adapting to both: 1) break the
attacker’s ability to follow the cyber cycle; 2) disrupt any
behavioral channels that outer layers may not be capable of
limiting. From a stability perspective, they must be able to keep
the system internally clean and provide constrained input into
the system. While the outside of the system produces complex,
non-deterministic disturbance inputs into an attacker’s control
system, the interior of the system must provide constrained
inputs and stable, regulated operation. We see this as fertile
ground for many follow-on research topics and applications.
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